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Abstract  
Purpose – This paper investigates the impact of regulations, reforms and legal environment 
on dividend policy in a different institutional setting. Particularly, it examines the firm-level 
cash dividend behaviour of publicly-listed firms in Turkey in the post-2003 period, since there 
were major economic and structural reforms as well as significant regulatory changes of 
dividend payout rules imposed by the supervisory bodies.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper focuses on a recent large panel dataset of 
264 Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)-listed firms over a ten-year period 2003-2012. First, it 
employs a modified specification of Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model for analysis 
regarding target payout ratio and dividend smoothing. Second, it performs a logit model for 
analysis in identifying the link between financial characteristics and the likelihood of paying 
dividends.  
Findings –  The results show that ISE firms now follow the same determinants as suggested 
by Lintner. They, indeed, have long-term payout ratios and adjust their cash dividends by a 
moderate level of smoothing, and therefore adopt stable dividend policies (although less 
stable policies compared to their counterparts in the developed US market) as a signalling 
mechanism over the period 2003-2012. Moreover, the results also report that ownership 
structure concentration affects the target payout ratio and dividend smoothing in the Turkish 
market. In addition, the results further show that more profitable, more mature and larger 
sized ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends, whereas ISE firms with higher 
investment opportunities and more debt are less likely to distribute cash dividends in the 
post-2003 period.  
Originality/value – To the best of author’s knowledge, this paper is the first major research 
that examines the implications of reforms and regulations on cash dividend payments and 
dividend smoothing over time in Turkey during its market integration process in the post-
2003 period. 
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1. Introduction  
Dividend policy has attracted a signifcant amount of attention in corporate finance 
literature. Miller and Modigliani (M&M) (1961) assert that, under the conditions of a perfect 
capital market, a managed dividend policy does not affect the firm value and therefore it is 
irrelevant. However, many scholars argue that real world capital markets are subject to 
various market imperfections (e.g. information asymmetries, differential taxes, transaction 
costs and agency problems) and suggest that dividends may be used as a very important 
mechanism to minimise such imperfections. Indeed, Lintner (1956) observes that US 
managers follow extremely deliberate (managed) dividend policies, contrary to M&M’s 
prediction. In his pioneering study, Lintner detects that US managers tend to smooth 
dividends relative to earnings; they only increase their dividend payments when they believe 
that earnings can sustain higher dividend levels permanently, and are reluctant to cut 
dividends unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist, since dividend cuts are bad 
signals to the market.  
Nevertheless, dividend policy decisions are not always solely dependent on 
managers’ judgement. This is because factors such as regulations and legal environments, 
institutional settings, financial crises, and trends in macro-economy may also have 
implications on a firm’s dividend policy (Glen et al, 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et 
al., 2003a; 2003b). For example, Aivazian et al. (2003a) and Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
argue that dividend payments may be a more useful pre-commitment device to reduce 
agency problems and to signal insider information in the “Anglo-Saxon” capital markets. For 
instance, in the US and the UK, where the ownership structure is generally dispersed among 
small shareholders and the control remains concentrated in the hands of managers, 
corporations rely on arm’s length contracting by “uninformed” and dispersed outside 
investors. In contrast, the “Continental-German-Japanese” banking model develops close 
ties between managers and investors, because bank debt is a contract with an informed 
investor (lender) who has access to confidential corporate information (due to direct 
communication, such as obtaining quarterly financial information in a standardised form or 
regular site visits) which is not available in the capital market. Consequently, they suggest 
that there are relatively lower levels of information asymmetry and agency conflicts in bank 
centric markets, and hence managed dividend policies might not be vital in these kinds of 
economies.  
Furthermore, there is an evidence that in some countries with poor legal environment 
and weak minority shareholders’ protection, typically emerging market (e.g., Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Greece, Philippines, Venezuela and Turkey), governments and regulators have 
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chosen to force publicly-listed firms to pay dividends in order to protect minority shareholders 
and creditors. Therefore, by dictating a minimum level of dividends (a mandatory dividend 
policy) that firms must adhere to, regulators have attempted to convince minority investors 
that they will not be expropriated (at least not entirely) and instead encourage them to invest 
in equity markets (Glen et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian, 2003a). This highlights 
how important the institutional setting is to dividend policy and implies that different 
institutional and financial environments may have different effects on a firm’s dividend 
payment decisions.  
Accordingly, our purpose is to investigate the implications of regulations, reforms and 
legal environment on dividend policy in a different institutional setting. We consider firm-level 
cash dividend behaviour of publicly-listed firms in Turkey over the period 2003-2012. It is 
because Turkey provides an interesting set up to study the dividend policy behaviour of an 
emerging market (a civil law originated) which implemented major economic and structural 
reforms (common laws) starting with the fiscal year 2003. There were also significant 
changes in regulatory framework of cash dividend policy rules imposed by the supervisory 
bodies in the post-2003 period.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional 
background and dividend regulations in Turkey. Section 3 reviews the previous studies and 
develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 
illustrates the empirical results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Institutional setting and dividend regulations in the Turkish market 
Turkey had a very late start in the liberalisation of its economy and the establishment 
of its stock market, namely the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), whose history only dates 
back to 1986, compared to the developed stock exchanges with hundreds of years of 
historical development (Adaoglu, 2000; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Public corporations listed 
on the ISE were subject to the first mandatory dividend policy, which was put into effect by 
the Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey1, when it first started to operate in 1986. 
According to the first regulation on dividend payments, the ISE-listed firms were obliged to 
distribute at least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend - this was known as 
the first dividend and other types of payouts or maintaining profits as retained earnings were 
not legally possible without paying the first dividend.  
                                                          
1
 The Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey is the sole regulatory and supervisory authority in 
charge of the securities markets in Turkey. The CMB was established in 1982 as a statutory public 
legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy, empowered by the Capital Markets Law (CML) 
that was enacted in 1981, in order to maintain secure, transparent, efficient, fair and competitive 
capital markets, and to protect rights and interests of investors (CMB, 2003).  
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Adaoglu (1999; 2000) states that the reason behind the first mandatory dividend 
policy imposed by the CMB of Turkey was, probably, to protect minority shareholders’ right 
by providing them satisfactory levels of dividends. This is because Turkey experienced a 
poor culture of corporate governance coupled with the lack of appropriate transparency and 
disclosure practices, with very poor minority shareholders’ protection until the early 2000s 
(La Porta et al, 1997; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Besides, corporate ownership in Turkey is 
highly concentrated by families who generally owned business groups, which were affiliated 
with industrial and financial companies and subsidiaries that organised under the legal form 
of a holding company. The controlling families often attempted to use pyramidal corporate 
structures or even more complicated web of inter-corporate equity linkages and dual class 
shares to further enhance the control on their companies at the expense of other 
shareholders (Glen et al, 1995; Yurtoglu, 2003; Sevil et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, prior research (Aivazian et al, 2003a; 2003b; Ararat and Ugur, 2003; 
Erturk, 2003) indicates that Turkey had a bank-based financial system where private sector 
banks dominated the market and were mainly part of bigger family-owned holding 
companies. The popularity of holding company structures led the Turkish financial system to 
operate around large family-controlled business groups with a group-owned bank. Hence, 
families had control over many banks that belonged to their business groups, and also had 
control over their banks’ lending decisions. This resulted in business groups obtaining much 
of their finance from their own banks - in other words allowing non-arm’s length party 
transactions (Yurtoglu, 2003; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). 
As previously mentioned, Aivaizan et al. (2003a) and Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
argue that dividend payments may be a more useful pre-commitment device to reduce 
agency problems and to convey information in markets that are greatly dependent on arm’s 
length transactions. Considering the nature of the ISE-listed firms’ corporate structures, 
which were highly concentrated by large controlling families and characterised by bank-
centred finance as well as close owner-bank-firm relations, one can easily deduce that cash 
dividends were not used to signal favourable insider information nor were they used as a 
disciplinary device, and managers did not much care about setting stable dividend policies in 
the early stages of the Turkish market. Applying Lintner’s (1956) model, the studies of 
Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et al (2003a), which were conducted in early periods in Turkey 
(the periods 1985-1997 and 1983-1990, respectively) demonstrated that ISE firms did not 
smooth their cash dividends and thus had unstable cash dividend polices; cash dividends 
were solely determined by current year earnings, as forced by the first dividend rule, and any 
volatility in earnings of the firms was directly reflected in the levels of current cash dividends.  
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However, Turkey had undergone major economic and structural reforms in the early 
2000s. The CMB of Turkey attributed great importance to improve communications with 
investors, issuers and other institutions to ensure that markets were functioning in a safer, 
more transparent and more efficient manner in accordance with regulations that were 
adopted in harmony with international norms and developments (CMB, 2003) - some of the 
important improvements were the adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), the publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles, the 
introduction of  the Banking Sector Restructuring Program and the Regulation on 
Establishment and Operations of Banks (to minimise credit risk concentration within a 
business group and avoid insider trading), and the accelerated privatization of the State 
Economic Enterprises.  
More importantly, the ISE-listed firms have been subject to a significantly different set 
of dividend policy regulations after the implementation of major reform in 2003. The CMB 
introduced the second mandatory dividend policy in 2003, which was much more flexible 
compared to the first one and only forced the ISE firms to pay at least 20% of their 
distributable income as a first dividend but the listed firms did not have to pay the first 
dividend entirely in cash. Instead, they had the option to distribute it in cash or stock 
dividends or a mixture of both, which was then subject to the board of directors’ ultimate 
decision. Further, for the fiscal year 2004, the CMB increased the minimum percentage of 
mandatory dividend payments for the ISE-listed firms from 20% to 30%, which also stayed at 
this level for the fiscal year 2005. Then, the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend 
payment level was again reduced to 20% in the fiscal year 2006 and remained at this level 
for the fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Nonetheless, from the fiscal year 2009 and onwards 
(2010, 2011 and 2012), the CMB decided to not determine a minimum dividend payout ratio 
and abolished mandatory minimum dividend payment distribution requirement for the ISE 
firms, which provided total freedom for the ISE-listed firms to make their own dividend policy 
decisions to pay or not to pay, with the requirement that any decisions made regarding 
dividends should be publicly disclosed. 
3. Prior studies and research hypotheses  
In a pioneering study, Lintner (1956) develops a mathematical model based on his 
extensive in-depth interviews with US managers to test for the stability of cash dividend 
payments. His model reveals that firms set current dividend payments in line with their 
current earnings and previous year dividend payments, and they make partial adjustments to 
a target payout ratio and do not match immediately with the earnings changes. In fact, 
various researchers from developed and developing countries have been strongly supportive 
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of Lintner’s findings and reported consistency of results across many markets and different 
periods of time. For example, early studies such as Darling (1957), Brittain (1964) and Fama 
and Babiak (1968) re-evaluate and extend the Lintner model, by adding supplementary 
variables or undertaking more comprehensive approaches, and they all confirm the original 
findings of Lintner that US companies follow stable dividend policies.  
McDonald et al. (1975) examine the dividend, investment and financing decisions of 
French firms, and report that dividends of French firms are well-explained by current profit 
and lagged dividends in the dividend model of Lintner, whereas investment and financing 
variables appear to be insignificant in the dividend equation. Chateau (1979) tests the partial 
adjustment model on large Canadian manufacturing firms, and finds that Canadian 
corporations follow stable dividend policies – especially, they are more conservative 
compared to American firms when it comes to short-term dividend strategies although they 
have a higher average payout ratio. Dewenter and Warther (1998) compare dividend polices 
of US and Japanese firms, and report that, using the Lintner model, US dividends are 
smoother than Japanese dividends and Japanese firms reduce dividends in response to 
poor performance more quickly than US firms.  
A number of studies have investigated dividend policy behaviour in different 
developing countries by applying Lintner’s (1956) explanation. For instance, Mookerjee 
(1992) shows that Lintner model explains dividend behaviour in India. Pandey’s (2001) 
research reveals that although Malaysian firms have low smoothing and less stable 
dividends (higher adjustment factors), they rely both on current earnings and past dividends. 
In another study, Al-Najjar (2009) also reports that the Lintner model successfully explains 
Jordanian markets’ dividend behaviour, and further suggests that Jordanian firms have 
target payout ratios and they partially adjust dividends to their target but relatively faster than 
those in US (developed) market. Chemmanur et al. (2010) compare dividend policies of 
Hong Kong firms and US firms. Their study indicates that dividend payments in Hong Kong 
are more closely related to current year earnings and thus the extent of dividend smoothing 
by Hong Kong firms is considerably less than those in the US. Furthermore, Al-Ajmi and Abo 
Hussain (2011) show that current dividends are determined by lagged dividends and current 
earnings as proposed by Lintner in Saudi Arabia; however, Saudi firms have more flexible 
dividend policies since they act quickly to increase dividend payments and are willing to cut 
or skip dividends when earnings decline. Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) examine dividend 
smoothing in Oman, and find that Omani firms adjust their dividends toward their target 
payout ratio gradually, more interestingly with a relatively low speed of adjustment, as 
compared to other firms in developed and emerging economies.  
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However, Adaoglu (2000) reports that publicly-listed firms in Turkey do not smooth 
their dividends. Aivazian et al (2003a) find that the Lintner model does not work very well for 
the eight emerging market (Turkey, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Jordan, Malaysia, South 
Korea, Zimbabwe) firms, whereas it still works well for their US counterparts. Despite these 
early studies conducted in Turkey report inconsistent results with the Lintner argument, 
possibly due to the mandatory payout requirement of at least 50% of earnings as a cash 
dividend, we, however, argue that there are reasons suggesting that the ISE firms may 
adopt traditional Lintner style managed dividend policies in the post-2003 period.  
First, as already stated, Turkey has shown a serious effort by implementing various 
financial and structural reforms to improve its market economy and converge with the global 
world-markets. Accordingly, this period (2003-2012) has experienced a rapid growth in 
market capitalisation and trading volume, and especially has attracted a significant amount 
of foreign investment (CMB, 2003; 2012). Considering the significant flexibility provided in 
setting their dividend policies (compared to the first mandatory dividend payout rule) during 
the period 2003-2008 and even the total freedom granted by the CMB (since not determining 
any compulsory dividend payment requirement starting with 2009), the ISE-listed firms have 
begun making their own dividend policy decisions. This has also allowed investors to 
interpret dividend policies of ISE firms efficiently in reflecting their judgements in the share 
prices (Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). Hence, one can argue that these recent developments may 
have important effects on ISE firms’ corporate financial policies, especially their dividend 
policy decisions. Because, ISE managers may then use cash dividends as a credible sign to 
convey their insider information to both foreign and national investors, and are likely to 
smooth their dividend payment stream to strengthen the credibility of dividends reflecting 
their firms’ good financial performance.  
Moreover, Turkey had serious issues with insider lending (in other words non-arm’s 
length transactions) within business groups owned by families in early stages. This, indeed, 
reduced the need for dividend signalling and stability, and the role of dividends as a 
disciplinary mechanism in the Turkish market. Additionally, heavily regulated mandatory 
dividend policy requirement at the same time did not give the ISE firms many options to 
effectively use dividend policy. Nevertheless, considering the CMB’s severe amendments in 
preventing insider trading as a source of financing and considerably relaxed divided policy 
regulations in early 2000s, the ISE have turned to the equity market with greater intensive for 
more transparent financing with more flexibility in making their own dividend policies. Hence, 
these are other reasons suggesting that Lintner style dividend policies might be adopted by 
the ISE managers. Besides, there is substantial evidence (Mookerjee, 1992; Pandey, 2001; 
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Al-Najjar, 2009; Chemmanur et al., 2010; Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain, 2011; Al-Malkawi et al., 
2014) that shows support for the Lintner model in explaining dividend behaviour in various 
emerging economies – yet they generally report higher adjustment factors, hence lower 
smoothing and less stable dividend policies compared to developed countries. Therefore, we 
hypothesise: 
H1: Firms have their target payout ratios and adjust their dividends by dividend 
smoothing (consistent with the Lintner model) in the post-2003 period in Turkey.  
Although the implementation of various major economic and structural reforms has 
improved in many areas in Turkish corporate governance, transparency and disclosure 
practices in the post-2003 period, the concentrated ownership structure is still prevailing 
form in Turkey, where families dominate its capital market with the existence of other large 
shareholders – especially, foreign investors followed by financial institutions and the state 
(Caliskan and Icke, 2011; Sevil et al., 2012; Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan, 2016). Therefore, 
ownership structure becomes critical since the related dividend literature suggests that large 
shareholders affect firms’ dividend policies. 
Prior research shows mixed results on the impact of large shareholders on dividend 
policy. For instance, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find a negative correlation between the 
largest shareholder’s ownership and dividend policy, and Khan (2006) also reports that 
ownership concentration negatively associates with dividend payouts, whereas Kouki and 
Guizani (2009) present evidence that firms with concentrated ownership distribute higher 
dividends. Faccio et al. (2001) detect that the existence of multiple large shareholders 
increases dividend payments in Western Europe but decreases in East Asia, thus implying 
that other large shareholders attempt to minimise the expropriation activity of the controlling 
shareholders in Europe, while they tend to exacerbate it in Asia. In a very recent study, Al-
Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) find that family owners do not seem to expropriate through 
dividends and cash dividends are not used as a monitoring mechanism by investors in 
Turkey. Differently from the mentioned studies, our aim, however, is to identify how 
ownership structure affects the target payout ratio and dividend smoothing in Turkey. This is 
because, we conjecture that firms’ concerns about the dividend stability significantly differ 
based on the type and the existence of large shareholders.  
La Porta et al. (2000) posit that dividends are the substitutes for legal protection in 
emerging countries with poor institutional settings and weak minority shareholders’ 
protection (the substitute model of dividends) - a reputation for good treatment of 
shareholders is worth the most in these economies, and by paying dividends, controlling 
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shareholders return profits to investors, which reduce the possibility of expropriation of 
wealth from others, therefore establishing a good reputation. In this case, steady dividend 
payments might also be employed by the family-controlled ISE firms as a reputation 
mechanism as well as an indication of good financial performance to attract capital during 
the post-2003 market integration period. Hence, we hypothesise:  
H2a: Family-controlled firms are likely to have relatively higher target payouts and 
pay smoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.  
There are other types of blockholders (rather than family owners) that may take 
several distinct forms such as foreign shareholders, the state and financial institutions 
ownership. According to Grossman and Hart (1980), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986), large shareholders have better incentives and ability to act as an 
effective monitoring mechanism on the management when the legal protection does not 
provide enough control rights to minority investors. The existence of such large shareholders 
can mitigate the free-rider problem of monitoring managers and the shareholders conflict, 
which minimises the agency problems and consequently reducing, in general, the need for 
paying cash dividends. Thus: 
H2b: Firms with high prevalence of non-family blockholders are likely to have low 
target payouts and pay unsmoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.  
The downside of ownership concentration is that the interests of large shareholders 
and minority owners might not be the same. If this is the case, large shareholders may 
attempt to generate private benefits of control that are not shared with outside shareholders 
and hence exacerbating agency cost problems by expropriating the wealth from minority 
owners (Johnson et al., 2000; Mork and Yeung, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Aforementioned, dividends payments can play an important role in controlling the conflict of 
interest between large and minority shareholders, since dividends guaranty a pro-rata cash 
distribution to all shareholders and limit corporate funds from large shareholders’ control. 
Accordingly, we predict that although the existence of other non-family blockholders may 
reduce the importance of dividends as a disciplining mechanism and the need for dividend 
stability, family-controlled firms will still attempt to use dividends as a reputation device for 
fair treatment for minority owners when their firms are highly concentrated. Therefore:  
H2c: Family-controlled firms with other non-family blockholders are likely to have high 
target payouts and pay moderately smoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.  
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Furthermore, in widely held firms, where ownership structure is dispersed among 
small shareholders, corporate managers are in the controlling positions. Since they are the 
insiders who control corporate assets, managers may misuse these resources at the 
expense of outside shareholders due the absence of effective monitoring, which is known as 
the principal-agent conflict. Nevertheless, dividend payments can be used to lessen these 
kinds of agency problems by reducing free cash flows and forcing firms to enter the external 
capital markets for additional funding, thus increase monitoring by the market (Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986). Indeed, previous studies (e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Moh’d et al., 1995; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Farinha, 2003) generally show that minority shareholders desire higher 
dividend payments to increase dividend-induced capital market monitoring and reduce what 
is left for expropriation. Hence, we hypothesise:  
H2d: Firms with dispersed ownership structures are likely to have higher target 
payouts and pay unsmoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.  
Corporate dividend policy literature suggests that there is a direct link between 
financial characteristics of a firm and its dividend policy decisions. In this respect, not 
surprisingly, we conjecture that the market integration process of Turkey, especially these 
major regulatory developments as explained, might lead the financial characteristics of ISE 
firms to significantly affect their dividend policies.  While the Lintner model is expected to be 
valid in explaining dividend policy behaviour in Turkey, it does not indicate how financial 
characteristics affect dividend payments of the ISE firms. Therefore, we will investigate the 
effects of various fundamental financial factors on dividend policy decisions, in line with the 
prior research. 
First, it is argued that profitability is one of the most important determinants of 
dividend policy and empirical studies generally report a positive relationship between firm’s 
profitability and dividend payments (Fama and French, 2001; Aivazian et al., 2003b; Ferris et 
al., 2006). Considering the much more flexible dividend payment regulations in the post-
2003 period, we posit that highly profitable ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends to 
convey their better financial position. Thus:  
H3a: There is a positive association between profitability and dividend policy in the 
post-2003 period in Turkey.  
Contrarily, a firm’s funds requirements for growth (investment) opportunities appear 
to have a negative impact on dividend payouts (Rozeff, 1982; Baker and Wurgler, 2004; 
Aivazian et al., 2006). Similarly, a firm’s debt policy is associated with dividend payments in 
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a negative way, since dividends and debt are considered as alternative mechanisms to 
control agency costs (Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Al-Najjar, 2009). Given 
that the CMB of Turkey has shown a serious effort to prevent credit risk concentration and 
insider lending within the same business group companies, the ISE firms find external 
financing a way more costly, rather than obtaining much of their funds required from their 
own business group banks, in the post-2003 period. Hence, we propose that ISE firms are 
more likely to use their internally generated earnings to fund their investments, instead of 
distributing them as a cash dividend. By emphasising the transaction costs involved with 
external financing and the substitution role of debt for dividends in controlling agency 
problems, we also predict that ISE firms with more debt are less likely to pay dividends. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses:  
H3b: There is a negative association between investment opportunities and dividend 
policy in the post-2003 period in Turkey. 
H3c: There is a negative association between debt policy and dividend policy in the 
post-2003 period in Turkey.  
Moreover, firm age and firm size are other two important factors that appear to be 
positively influencing dividend policy in the literature. Since firms get older in terms of age, in 
other words mature firms, they tend to have steady earnings and hence are able to preserve 
a good level of funds. This allows them to pay higher dividends (Grullon et al., 2002). 
Likewise, it is documented that large firms are generally mature organisations and have 
easier access to capital markets at lower costs but they usually face higher potential agency 
problems as they expand, compared to smaller firms. Accordingly, this results in a positive 
relationship between firm size and dividends (Moh’d et al., 1995; Fama and French, 2001; 
Ferris et al., 2006). Based on the above discussion and given the new regulatory reforms in 
preventing insider lending, we dispute that more mature and larger sized ISE firms are more 
likely to sustain stable funds and have easier access to capital markets (to raise costly 
external finance if needed), and so they are less dependent on retained earnings and hence 
they can manage to pay higher dividends. Therefore:  
H3d: There is a positive association between firm age and dividend policy in the post-
2003 period in Turkey. 
H3e: There is a positive association between firs size and dividend policy in the post-
2003 period in Turkey.  
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4. Data and Methodology  
4.1 Data  
We obtain the data for this study from several different sources. Information on 
accounting and financial variables is derived from DATASTREAM, whereas the data on 
firms’ ownership and incorporation dates are compiled from the annual reports published in 
the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) of the ISE and firms’ official websites. The validity of 
the data is also cross checked with OSIRIS database. We, then, construct our sample as 
follows. First, we consider all publicly listed firms on the ISE over the period 2003-2012. 
Second, we narrow the sample down to firms whose data are available on DATASTREAM. 
Third, we exclude financial (Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code 8000) and utility 
(ICB code 7000) sector companies. These criteria provide us an unbalanced panel of 2,112 
firm-year observations representing 264 unique ISE firms from 14 different industries (based 
on ICB codes) over the period 2003-2012.  
4.2 Research design, models and variable construction  
 In order to test our hypotheses related to the target payout ratio and dividend 
smoothing (i.e., H1, H2a, H2b, H2c, and H2d), we first employ a modified specification of 
Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model. In particular, (i) following Fama and Babiak (1968) 
– as many other researchers, such as Adaoglu (2000), Aivazian et al. (2003a), Al-Najjar 
(2009), Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011), and Al-Malkawi et al. (2014), we use firm-level data 
(in other words, per share data) instead of aggregate data used by Lintner. This is because 
dividend policy decisions are made by each individual firm and hence firm-level data are 
more appropriate for examining firm-specific choices, which might not be properly captured 
by using aggregate data that may simply reflect the common growth trends. (ii) We include a 
dummy variable in the model to identify whether there is a significant impact of different 
payout regulations on dividends, since the ISE firms were subject to two significantly 
different dividend payment regulations between the sub-periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2012 
over the entire research period. (iii) We also introduce the interaction terms between the 
period dummy and the explanatory variables. (iv) Finally, we attempt to control for the 
industry-effect by adding industry dummies into the model. Accordingly, we construct the 
following equation:  
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 where DPS
i,t 
is the current dividends per share and EPS
i,t 
is the current year earnings 
per share for firm i at year t; DPS
i,t-1 
is the lagged dividends per share for firm i that 
distributed in year t-1 (previous year); PERIOD
i,t 
is a dummy taking a value of 0 for the sub-
period 2003-2008 and 1 for the sub-period 2009-2012; (PERIOD
i,t 
x EPS
i,t 
) and (PERIOD
i,t 
x 
DPS
i,t-1 
) are the interaction terms between period dummy and earnings per share, and 
period dummy and lagged dividends per share, respectively; INDUSTRY
j,i,t 
is a vector of 
dummy variables representing 14 different industries (based on ICB codes). 
Furthermore, in testing our hypotheses based on the link between five fundamental 
financial characteristics and dividend policy (i.e., H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d and H3e), we attempt 
to formulate a model, which helps determine the effects of these financial factors on the 
probability of paying a cash dividend. More specifically, (i) we estimate a logit model – 
because when firms make their dividend policy decisions, they face two options; to pay or 
not to pay dividends, and hence a logit regression model is an appropriate econometric 
technique for estimating the binary dependent variable (0/1). (ii) Again, we add a period 
dummy proxing for the two sub-periods of different dividend payment regulations, and the 
interactions terms between the period dummy and the five financial characteristics variables, 
into the model. (iii) As well, we include industry dummies for controlling the industry-effect. 
(iv) Finally, we also consider the issue of endogeneity and use one-year lagged values for all 
independent variables in the model, ensuring that the five financial characteristics are 
predetermined with respect to the dividend payment decision, to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns. Accordingly, we estimate a logit model by the following equation:  
DPAY
i,t  
=  β
0   
+   β
1 
ROA
i,t-1    
+   β
2 
INVEST
i,t-1  
+ β
3 
DEBT
i,t-1 
+  β
4 
AGE
i,t-1 
 + β
5 
SIZE
i,t-1 
+      
β
6
PERIOD
i,t
  +  β
7
(PERIOD
i,t 
x ROA
i,t-1
)  +  β
8
(PERIOD
i,t 
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i,t-1
) + 
β
9
(PERIOD
i,t 
x DEBT
i,t-1
) + β
10
(PERIOD
i,t 
x AGE
i,t-1
) + β
11
(PERIOD
i,t 
x SIZE
i,t-1
) 
+   ∑  𝑛𝑗=1 βj INDUSTRYj,i,t    +  ui,t -1,         (2) 
 
 
                       0   if     DPay
i,t 
 = 0, 
DPAY
i,t 
  =    
                       1   if     DPay
i,t  
> 0, 
                         
 
where DPAY
i,t 
is the probability of paying dividends (dependent variable), which is a 
binary code (0/1) that equals to 1 if the firm pays a dividend and 0 otherwise in a given year 
over the period 2003-2012; ROA is the return on assets ratio (profitability) measured as net 
earnings to total assets; INVEST is the market-to-book ratio (investment opportunities); 
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DEBT is the debt ratio measured as total debt divided by total assets; AGE is the firm age 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of years since the firm’s incorporation 
date; SIZE is the firms size measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation; 
PERIOD
 
is a dummy taking a value of 0 for the sub-period 2003-2008 and 1 for the sub-
period 2009-2012; (PERIOD x ROA), (PERIOD x INVEST), (PERIOD x DEBT), (PERIOD x 
AGE) and (PERIOD x SIZE) are the individual interaction terms between period dummy and 
each of the five explanatory variables, respectively; INDUSTRY is a vector of industry 
dummy variables.2 
5. Empirical results and discussion  
5.1 Univariate analysis  
Due to the significant regulatory changes on dividend policy during our research 
period, we provide univariate analysis by comparing various financial factors, ownership 
structures and cash dividend characteristics of the sampled firms for two sub-periods, 2003-
2008 and 2009-2012. We use a number of Levene’s tests for equality of variance, standard 
t-tests for equality of mean (without assuming equality of variance) and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, to find whether the two sub-periods are similar or considerably 
different on each factor.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Panel A in Table 1 displays the results of univariate tests of ten financial 
characteristics for the two sample sub-periods. We find that total sales, total assets, market 
capitalisation, net earnings and total debt are, on average, 670 million TL (Turkish Lira), 619 
million TL, 485 million TL, 39 million TL and 130 million TL, respectively for the sub-period 
2003-2008, and 986 million TL, 1,026 million TL, 866 million TL, 56 million TL and 278 
million TL respectively for the sub-period 2009-2012. All these differences are statistically 
significant and indicate a considerable amount of increase on each of the five characteristics 
from 2003-2008 to 2009-2012. The results for return on assets, market-to-book ratio, debt 
ratio, firm age and firm size are also found to be statistically significant. More specifically, 
market-to-book and debt ratios and firm age and size (in natural logarithm) show higher 
levels, whereas return on assets dramatically decreases over the sub-period 2009-2012, 
compared to the sub-period 2003-2008. Hence, univariate tests reveal that there are 
significant differences in financial characteristics of ISE firms between the two time-periods.  
                                                          
2
 Although not separately reported here, using Pearson’s correlation and Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF), we detect that there is no multicollinearity problem exist between our independent variables. 
The results are available from authors upon request.  
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Panel B of Table 1 presents the analyses of differences for ownership structures 
between two sub-periods. We categorise shareholdings into six types; ownerships of family, 
foreign, domestic institutions, the state and minority investors (ownership dispersion) and 
miscellaneous. We also look at firms’ board size and the number of controlling family 
members on the board. The results show that ISE firms have highly concentrated and 
centralised ownership structures. Families, on average, own around 39% of total equity in 
the sub-period 2003-2008, and about 40% during the sub-period 2009-2012. Foreign 
investors are the second largest blockholders, holding approximately 12-13% of total shares 
in both sub-periods. Minority investors have, on average, about 35% of total equity in the first 
sub-period, whereas their fraction is just a bit over 36% in the second one. However, none of 
these differences between the two sub-periods are statistically significant. Other 
blockholders show relatively lower shareholdings on average; domestic financial institutions’ 
ownership is around 4% in both sub-periods, and the state owns just about 2% of total 
shares during 2003-2008 and 1% during 2009-2012, which is the only statistically significant 
difference between two sub-periods. Moreover, the board size and controlling family 
members on the board in the last two rows of the Panel B illustrate that at least one family 
member takes a place on the board, which are generally sized on 6-7 executives, similarly in 
both time periods.  
 Panel C in Table 1 reports the results of univariate analyses performed for the 
sample’s cash dividend payment characteristics between the sub-period 2003-2008, when 
the CMB imposed mandatory dividend payout ratios, and the period 2009-2012, when the 
CMB abolished mandatory minimum dividend payment requirement. We find that among 
those ISE-listed firms in our sample, almost 34% of them paid cash dividends in both sub-
periods, indicating no significant difference in the percentage numbers of cash dividend 
payers over time. Likewise, the average dividends paid per share (0.169 TL during 2003-
2008 and 0.172 TL during 2009-2012) and dividend payout ratio (25.5% during 2003-2008 
and 23% during 2009-2012) show very similar levels in both time periods. Contrarily, we 
observe that there is evidence of significant differences in the magnitude of cash dividends 
distributed and in the percentage of dividend yield. Particularly, in the second sub-period 
after the abolishment of the mandatory dividend policy starting with the fiscal year 2009, ISE 
firms, on average, significantly increased their cash dividend payments from 16 million TL to 
26 million TL; however, their average dividend yield ratio significantly dropped from 2.1% to 
1.6% during this sub-period.  
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5.2 Analysis of a modified specification of Lintner model 
We apply our modified specification of Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model on 
the Turkish panel dataset, using the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. We 
compute two estimates for this model (Model 1); the first one consists of estimates based on 
all firms in the sample (1,846 observations) and the second one contains estimates from 
only dividend-paying firms (1,121 observations). Also, we use White’s corrected 
heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Panel A in Table 2 shows the results of estimates 
from the pooled OLS regressions.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The results indicate that the overall pooled OLS models estimating the modified 
Lintner equation (Model 1) are statistically significant at the 1% level for both samples of all 
firms and dividend-payers (that is where we exclude all zero dividend-paying firms), as 
reported by F-statistics. The R-squared values of 46.13 for all firms and 45.91 for dividend-
payers show a decent level of goodness of fit, suggesting that about 46% of the variation in 
the firm-level cash dividend payments, in both samples, are explained by the model.  
With regard to our main explanatory variables of interest, the coefficients on current 
EPS (t = 3.22, p < 0.01 for all firms and t = 4.30, p < 0.01 for dividend-payers) and lagged 
DPS (t = 6.74, p < 0.01 for all firms and t = 9.78, p < 0.01 for dividend-payers) are both 
highly significant and positive. This shows that the two variables of the basic Lintner model 
works well in explaining cash dividends of the ISE firms over the period 2003-2012, after 
Turkey implemented major economic and structural reforms in 2003 as well as adopting 
more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations and attempting to prevent insider 
lending. Consistent with many previous studies conducted in various emerging markets 
(e.g., Mookerjee, 1992; Pandey, 2001; Al-Najjar, 2009; Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain, 2011; Al-
Malkawi et al., 2014), this evidence suggests that current year’s dividends per share is the 
function of the level of current earnings per share and the pattern of dividend per share in 
the previous year in the post-2003 period in Turkey. This is, however, inconsistent with the 
findings of earlier studies of Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et al. (2003a), which report no 
support to the validity of the Lintner model in the Turkish market, possibly due to the 
presence of rigid mandatory dividend payout rules imposed to the ISE firms during the 
earlier periods. 
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Moreover, we add a dummy variable (PERIOD) that takes a value of 0 for the second 
mandatory dividend policy time interval (2003-2008) and 1 for the period when there was no 
compulsory dividend payout requirement (2009-2012). Because, we attempt to identify 
whether there is an impact of considerably different policy regulations on dividends over our 
entire research period. We also create two interaction term variables to provide further 
insights on the interaction effects of sub-periods and earnings per share (PERIOD x EPS), 
and that of sub-periods and lagged dividends per share (PERIOD x DPS
t-1
) on current 
dividends per share. As Panel A in Table 2 illustrates, PERIOD coefficients are negative and 
significant (t = −1.77, p < 0.10 for all firms and t = −1.69, p < 0.10 for dividend-payers). The 
estimated coefficients on PERIOD x EPS are negative and significant (t = −1.90, p < 0.10 for 
all firms and t = −1.86, p < 0.10 for dividend-payers), whereas PERIOD x DPS
t-1 
show a 
positive and highly significant interaction effect (t = 6.08, p < 0.01 for all firms and t = 5.52, p 
< 0.01 for dividend-payers).  
At first glance, the negative impact of sub-periods dummy suggests that there is a 
tendency to decrease dividends in the second sub-period 2009-2012, when firms are not 
subject to imposed policy regulations, compared to the first sub-period 2003-208. In addition 
to the positive relationship between past and current year’s dividends per share, the 
interaction of sub-period dummy and lagged dividends per share also has a positive effect 
on current dividends per share. This implies that ISE firms tend to make stabilized dividends 
although mandatory dividend regulations are abolished. However, current year’s earnings 
per share through the interaction with period dummy has an inverse impact on current 
dividends. This may indicate either that ISE firms are more likely to avoid immediate 
response to earnings increases or losses; instead they attempt to balance stable dividends 
and prevent spectacular changes in the short-run, or that ISE firms are less willing to pay 
cash dividends in the second sub-period. Therefore, we need to rearrange our research 
model of the modified Lintner specification (Equation (1)) to understand how to interpret 
these coefficients and to identify their effects on dividend policy and stability. 
So we recall Equation (1): 
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(1b) 
where β
1 
= c
i
.r
i  and β2 = 1 – ci. The parameter ci represents the speed of adjustment 
coefficient (hereafter SOA), whereas r
i 
stands for the target payout ratio (hereafter TPR). The 
SOA (c
i 
= 1 – β
2 
) illustrates the stability in dividend changes by calculating the adjustment 
speed to the TPR (r
i 
 =  β1 ⁄1 – β2 ) in response to changes in earnings. Thus, it reveals firm 
i’s behaviour of dividend smoothing to variations in the earnings levels over the sub-period 
2003-2008.  
Now, if we let PERIOD = 1, which reflects the sub-period 2009-2012, in Equation (1): 
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(1d) 
Accordingly, the calculation of Lintner’s parameters changes when PERIOD = 1, as 
we must consider the interaction terms coefficients to capture the effects of earnings per 
share and lagged dividends per share through the interaction with the period dummy on 
dividends per share and dividend stability. Then, the SOA can be calculated by [c
i 
= 1 – (β
2 
+ 
β
5 
)] and the TPR can be obtained by [r
i 
 =  (β1+ β4) ⁄1 – (β2 + β5)] from Equation (1d) for the 
sub-period 2009-2012.  
As suggested by Lintner (1956), the SOA parameter shows how reactive dividends 
are to earnings changes, and lies between 0 and 1 (0 < c ≤ 1). A high SOA indicates a 
speedy adjustment towards the target; for instance, the SOA of 1 (at its maximum level) 
implies that the firm does not adjust or smooth cash dividends, instead it relies on the long-
run TPR. A reverse argument is valid for low SOAs that indicate slower adjustments; for 
example, a value of SOA closed to zero means that the firm smooths dividend payments and 
slowly adjusts to the TPR. In this respect, Panel A in Table 2 reports our SOA and TPR 
estimates based on the pooled OLS regressions. Using the formulas explained above, we 
find that the SOA is 0.580 (c1 = 1 – 0.420) and TPR is 23.3% (r1 = 0.135 ⁄1 – 0.420) for all 
firms, whereas these parameters are 0.593 (c1 = 1 – 0.407) and 25.5% (r1 = 0.151 ⁄1 – 
0.407), respectively, for dividend-payers over the sub-period 2003-2008. We further detect 
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that the SOA is 0.521 [c2 = 1 – (0.420 + 0.059)] and TPR is 21.3% [r2 = 
(0.135 – 0.024) ⁄1 – 
(0.420 + 0.059)] for all firms, whereas they are 0.529 [c2 = 1 – (0.407 + 0.064)] and 22.5% [r2 
= (0.151 – 0.032) ⁄1 – (0.407 + 0.064)] for dividend-payers during the sub-period 2009-2012.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 displays a summary of estimates on the SOA and TPR parameters from our 
study and various empirical research conducted in different time periods and markets. For 
instance, Adaoglu (2000) finds a SOA factor of 1 and Aivazian et al. (2003a), similarly, report 
a very high SOA of 0.92 (0.88 if zero dividend-paying observations were excluded) for their 
Turkish samples. They conclude that ISE firms did not smooth their dividends and followed 
unstable dividend policies that were determined by the level of current earnings in earlier 
periods when the CMB imposed the minimum 50% of profit distribution as a cash dividend. 
In fact, Adaoglu and Aivazian et al. detect that the TPRs of listed firms were around 52% and 
49% (52% based on only dividend-paying observations), respectively, which were closely 
commensurate with the mandatory dividend payment requirement. Our results, however, 
show much lower SOAs (around 0.58 for all firms and 0.59 for dividend-payers) between 
2003 and 2008, compared to these studies, indicating a moderate level of dividend 
smoothing adopted by ISE firms in the sub-period when the CMB introduced the second 
mandatory dividend policy, which was more flexible than the first one but still required a 
minimum payout that ranged between 20% to 30%. Besides, our estimates of TPRs for this 
sub-period (about 23.3% for all firms and 25.5% for dividend-payers) are consistent with the 
second mandatory payout requirement, and suggest that ISE-listed firms do have their target 
payout ratios and adjust their cash dividends by moving gradually to their target at a 
moderate level of speed of adjustment. Furthermore, our SOA and TPR estimates for the 
sub-period 2009-2012 (approximately 0.52 and 21.3% for all firms, and 0.53 and 22.5% for 
dividend-payers, respectively) point out that after the abolishment of mandatory dividend 
payment requirement starting with the fiscal year 2009, ISE firms very slightly reduce their 
target payouts but still moderately smooth their dividends (even a little smoother).  
Compared to the other emerging markets, our SOAs are lower than that found by 
Mookerjee (1992) for India (c = 0.73), Chemmanur et al. (2010) for Hong Kong (c = 0.68), 
and Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011) for Saudi Arabia (c = 0.71) but slightly higher than that 
documented by Al-Najjar from Jordan (c = 0.43). However, our results generally report 
higher SOA estimates in comparison to the SOA values obtained by previous studies in the 
developed US market – that is, 0.30 reported by Lintner (1956), 0.45 obtained by Fama and 
Babiak (1968), and 0.28 detected by Chemmanur et al. (2010). Overall, we conclude that 
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dividend policy now plays an important role in signalling in Turkey; particularly, the ISE firms 
adjust their cash dividend payments towards their target payout ratios by a moderate level of 
dividend smoothing and tend to follow reasonably stable dividend policies in the post-2003 
period. Therefore, this provides support for H1.  
We further perform additional tests to check how robust our main results are. 
Although it is suggested that the partial adjustment model can be consistently estimated by 
the OLS3 (Gujarati, 2003), Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a more advanced model, 
called the system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), to deal with the potential 
endogeneity problem of a dynamic panel model where a lagged dependent variable is 
included into the equation as an explanatory variable. Hence, we use the system GMM 
regressions to estimate our research model (Model 1) to identify whether our results are 
sensitive to the usage of chosen econometric specification. Panel B in Table 2 illustrates the 
system GMM estimate results, which are very similar to the results of the pooled OLS 
estimates that are reported in Panel A in the same table. Thus, this confirms more robust 
and reliable results from both specifications.  
Additionally, we extend our research specification by adding further explanatory 
variables that are observed in the literature. Particularly, we first modify the equation by 
including the lagged earnings per share (following Fama and Babiak (1968)) in Model 2, and 
by including the current and lagged debt ratio (following Mookerjee (1992)) in Model 3. Table 
4 shows the estimates of the pooled OLS in Panel A and the system GMM estimates in 
Panel B for both extended specifications. The results indicate that ISE firms have their target 
payout ratios and adjust their dividends towards their target by a moderate level of 
smoothing in the post-2003 period, consistent with what we previously report and also 
confirming robustness of our main findings.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
5.3 Analysis of ownership structure effect on Lintner model specification 
In order to ascertain how ownership structure affects the target payout ratio and 
dividend smoothing of ISE-listed firms, we apply our modified Lintner specification (Model 1) 
on several subsamples that are constructed according to the type and existence of large 
shareholders. Therefore, we stratify our sample into four categories; Subsample A is 
                                                          
3
 Indeed, we also employ two types of panel models, namely fixed effects and random effects least 
squares. However, preliminary tests show that the pooled OLS models are more appropriate than the 
panel models in the context of our analyses. Therefore, we only report the results from the pooled 
OLS models. 
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comprised of firms under family control with large family ownership concentration. 
Subsample B consists of firms that are characterised by high prevalence of non-family 
blockholders (e.g., foreign and domestic institutional investors and the state) only. Firms in 
Subsample C are dominated by large controlling families and other non-family blockholders. 
Subsample D contains widely-held firms that have dispersed ownership structure with single 
ownership below %5. Accordingly, Table 5 shows the results of pooled OLS estimates for 
our four stratified subsamples based on observations both from all firms and dividend-paying 
firms.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 The results reveal that F-statistics of each of the eight pooled OLS regressions (four 
subsamples based on two estimates) are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
overall significance of all models. The R-squared values of estimated equations vary 
between 44% to 63% and thus suggest an acceptable level of goodness of fit. Furthermore, 
we observe that our main variables, current EPS and lagged DPS, and the dummy variable 
for sub-periods (PERIOD) with the interaction terms (PERIOD x EPS and PERIOD x DPSt-1) 
are statistically significant, although at different conventional significance levels, and have 
the same directional impacts as explained in the previous sub-section, in all regressions. 
However, the coefficients of these variables comparatively differ among four subsamples 
and hence indicate that the target payout ratios and dividend smoothing behaviour of firms in 
four categories are significantly different from each other. As hypothesised, this reflects the 
impact of ownership structure on dividend stability explanation proposed by Lintner (1956).  
 In this respect, our first important finding is that Subsample A has the highest target 
payout ratios (the TPRs of 29.7% and 27.4% for all firms, and 32.3% and 29.6% for 
dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively) and, more interestingly, the 
lowest adjustment factors (the SOAs of 0.249 and 0.218 for all firms, and 0.251 and 0.223 
for dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). Al-Najjar and 
Kilincarslan (2016) suggest that although family ownership is negatively associated with 
dividend payout, families do not seem to expropriate through cash dividends in Turkey since 
all other types of shareholders (even minority investors) also have significantly negative 
effects on the amount of dividend payouts. Our finding, however, reveals that the ISE firms 
with family ownership concentration and control aim high cash dividend distribution and 
display the stickiest dividend behaviour (in other words, the most stable dividend policies). 
This is also inconsistent with the expropriation argument and instead shows that when 
Turkish families pay cash dividends, they tend to use dividends as a reputation for good 
treatment of shareholders and to reflect their firms’ good financial performance. Contrarily, 
Subsample B has comparatively lower payouts (the TPRs of 16.4% and 13.6% for all firms, 
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and 17.8% and 14.5% for dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively) 
and the highest speed of adjustment factors (the SOAs of 0.953 and 0.936 for all firms, and 
0.949 and 0.926 for dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). Since 
Subsample B includes the ISE firms that are characterised by only non-family blockholders, 
this indicates that when foreign and/or domestic institutional investors and/or state hold large 
shareholdings alone, they appear to significantly decrease the target payout ratios and 
abolish dividend smoothing. Hence, our evidence reveals that non-family blockholders do 
not use cash dividends neither as a monitoring mechanism. Consistent with Al-Najjar and 
Kilincarslan (2016), nor as a signalling device, perhaps due to their efficient monitoring and 
information gathering abilities.  
Moreover, Subsample C has the second highest target payout ratios (the TPRs of 
25% and 22.9% for all firms, and 27.7% and 23.5% for dividend-payers in the first and 
second sub-period, respectively) and it has relatively moderate levels of speed of 
adjustments (the SOAs of 0.464 and 0.402 for all firms, and 0.470 and 0.404 for dividend-
payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). This finding shows that the ISE firms 
that are dominated my families and other types of large shareholders also aim to pay high 
cash dividends but, differently from the firms under family control only, the existence of non-
family blockholders decreases the degree of dividend smoothing. As predicted, families still 
attempt to use dividends as a reputation device for fair treatment of minority investors when 
their firms are highly concentrated with the presence of non-family blockholders, although 
less stable compared to firms in Subsample A. Finally, the ISE firms with dispersed 
ownership structures in Subsample D follow stable dividend policies by a serious degree of 
smoothing (the SOAs of 0.362 and 0.311 for all firms, and 0.360 and 0.302 for dividend-
payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). However, they have the lowest 
payout ratios (the TPRs of 9.9% and 9% for all firms, and 11.1% and 10.3% for dividend-
payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). This evidence is contrary to our 
prediction that minority shareholders have a taste for higher dividends to increase dividend-
induced capital market monitoring and reduce what is left for expropriation, as well as 
inconsistent with a number of studies, such as Rozeff (1982), Moh’d et al. (1995), La Porta 
et al. (2000) and Farinha (2003). Instead, this may imply that small shareholders in Turkey 
have a preference for capital gains over cash dividends. Consequently, above discussion 
provides support for H2a, H2b and H2c, but leads us to reject H2d.  
Again, we conduct further tests by employing the system GMM regressions for each 
of the eight model specifications of our subsamples, in order to check whether our findings 
are robust or sensitive to the usage of a different econometric technique. As illustrated in 
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Table 6, our system GMM estimates are consistent with our pooled OLS estimates and 
provide very similar TPRs and SOAs that reported in Table 5.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
5.4 Analysis of financial characteristics effect on dividend payment decisions  
 In this sub-section, we compute our logit model (Equation (2)) to identify how 
financial characteristics of ISE firms influence their dividend payment decisions, by applying 
pooled logit and random effects (panel) logit regression estimates. We also calculate the 
marginal effects (economic significance) of the independent variables to provide further 
interpretations in addition to the coefficient estimates (statistical significance). Table 7 
reports the results of the pooled and random effects logit estimations on the probability of 
firms to pay dividends in the Turkish market.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
The results show that when our logit model is estimated by the pooled logit 
regression, it is overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as evidenced by the Wald X2 
test. The Pseudo R2 value of 35.48% suggests a good indication as to the prediction power 
of the model. Similarly, the random effects (panel) regression also estimates that the model 
is overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as reported by the Wald X2 test. In this case, 
the likelihood-ratio test is highly significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the 
proportion of the total variance, contributed by the panel-level variance component (rho 
value) is significantly different from zero (0.6123). This suggests that random effects logit 
regression is more suitable than pooled logit regression in estimating the relationship 
between financial variables and dividend payment decisions in the ISE. This is also 
consistent with Gujarati (2003) which states that a random effect logit model, which uses 
both within and between (group) possible variations, is more favourable than a pooled logit 
model (ignoring the firm effects) in its estimating power, since it allows the derivation of more 
efficient estimators. Hence, we report our findings based on the random effects logit 
estimates, although both types of regressions provide similar results.  
The random effects logit estimates in Table 7 reveal that there is a strong positive 
correlation between profitability (ROA) and the probability of an ISE firm to distribute a cash 
dividend. The coefficient on ROA (z = 5.99, p < 0.01) is positive and highly significant, and 
the marginal effect of this variable shows, other things being equal, that a 10 percentage 
point increase in ROA will increase the probability of paying dividends by approximately 
11.37%. This suggests that more profitable ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends 
to signal their better financial performance, in line with previous research (e.g., Fama and 
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French, 2001; Aivazian et al., 2003b; Ferris et al., 2006). However, there is evidence that 
investment opportunities have a negative effect on dividend payment decisions of the ISE 
firms, since the coefficient on INVEST is negative and statistically significant (z = −3.02, p < 
0.01). The marginal effect of INVEST indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in 
investment opportunities will decrease the likelihood of paying a cash dividend by about 
1.5% for an average firm. This means that ISE firms with more investment opportunities 
need more funds, therefore they are more likely to preserve earnings for investments rather 
than paying dividends, consistent with studies such as Rozeff (1982), Baker and Wurgler 
(2004) and Aivazian et al. (2006).  
The results reveal another negative association, which is between firm debt level and 
dividend payment decisions. The coefficient on DEBT is negative and statistically significant 
(z = −2.63. p < 0.01) and the marginal effect of this variable shows that the probability of 
paying a cash dividend drops by around 2.78%, corresponding to a 10 percentage increase 
in debt level. This finding is in line with the notion that debt and dividends are alternative 
mechanisms in controlling agency problems and supports the argument that higher debt 
levels lead to higher risk and transaction cost involved with external financing (Jensen, 1986; 
Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Al-Najjar, 2009). Thus, ISE firms attempt to maintain their 
earnings to lower costly external financing, which results in distributing non or lower 
dividends. Moreover, the results report that corporate dividend payment decisions of ISE 
firms are positively affected by firm age (AGE) and size (SIZE). The coefficients on AGE (z = 
2.24, p < 0.05) and SIZE (z = 7.31, p < 0.01) are both positive and statistically significant. 
The marginal effects of AGE and SIZE confirm these positive associations and indicate that 
a 10 percentage point increase in AGE and SIZE will approximately result in a 0.65% and 
1.02% increase in the probability of paying a cash dividend, respectively. This evidence 
implies that more mature and larger sized ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends, 
consistent with Grullon et al. (2002), Moh’d et al. (1995), Fama and French (2001) and Ferris 
et al. (2006). This is possibly because they can sustain stable funds and have easier access 
to capital markets, thereby less dependent on retained earnings, which enable them to pay 
higher dividends. 
We further detect that the random effects estimates show no significant impact of the 
sub-period dummies (PERIOD) on the likelihood of paying dividends. Similarly, none of the 
interaction terms between period dummy and each of the five financial factors (PERIOD x 
ROA, PERIOD x INVEST, PERIOD x DEBT, PERIOD x AGE and PERIOD x SIZE) is 
statistically significant. This suggests that although the research period has witnessed 
significantly different dividend policy regulations imposed by the CMB (i.e., the sub-periods 
2003-2008 and 2009-2012), these fundamental financial characteristics have the same 
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influence on dividend policy over the entire period. Accordingly, we conclude that more 
profitable, more mature and larger sized ISE firms are more likely to pay dividends, whereas 
ISE firms with higher investment opportunities and more debt are less likely to pay dividends 
in the post-2003 period in Turkey. Hence, this provides supports for H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d and 
H3e.4  
6. Conclusion  
Using a sample of ISE-listed firms over the period 2003-2012, we examine the 
impact of regulations, reforms and legal environment on firm-level dividend policy, since this 
period witnessed various major economic and structural reforms implemented by the Turkish 
government and experienced significant changes in regulatory framework of cash dividend 
policy rules imposed by the CMB. Early studies conducted in Turkey showed that cash 
dividends were not used to signal favourable insider information nor were they used as a 
disciplinary device. The ISE firms concentrated on the first mandatory dividend payment 
requirement of distributing at least 50% of earnings as a cash dividend and thus did not 
much care about setting stable dividend policies. After the implementation of major reforms 
and the significant regulatory changes regarding dividend policy, our study, however, reveals 
that a number of important implications on cash dividend behaviour of the ISE firms in the 
post-2003 period.  
We, first, find that current earnings per share and lagged dividends per share are 
positive and significant factors in determining current dividends per share of the ISE-listed 
firms. This provides empirical support for the validity of Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment 
model in the Turkish market over the period 2003-2012. In this respect, we further detect 
that the ISE firms have their target payout ratios and adjust their cash dividends, unlike 
earlier periods. More precisely, when the CMB of Turkey introduced the second mandatory 
policy, which was more flexible compared to the first one but still required a minimum payout 
that ranged between 20% to 30%, the ISE firms had their target payouts that were closely 
commensurate with this requirement and adjusted their dividends by moving gradually to 
their target at a moderate level of speed of adjustment between 2003 and 2008. After the 
abolishment of compulsory payout requirement starting with the fiscal year 2009, the ISE 
firms had the freedom to make their own dividend policy decisions and they tended to 
slightly reduce their target payouts but still moderately smooth their dividends (even a little 
                                                          
4
 We also perform tobit models instead of logit models, since we substitute the binary dependent 
variable (the probability of paying dividends – 0/1) for dividend payout ratio, whereas all the 
independent variables have the same previous definitions. Although not reported here, the tobit 
estimates provide very similar results, confirming the robustness of the logit estimates. 
26 
 
smoother) between 2009 and 2012. Accordingly, we conclude that the ISE firms follow 
reasonably stable dividend policies in the post-2003 period.  
 Moreover, our findings reveal that listed firms in the ISE have highly concentrated 
ownership structures, where the control is generally in the hands of families with the 
existence of other large shareholders, such as foreign and domestic financial investors and 
the state. In this setting, we find that ownership structure affects the target payout ratio and 
dividend smoothing in Turkey, probably because the concerns about cash dividends differ 
among the type and the existence of large shareholders. Indeed, it is observed that the ISE 
firms with family ownership concentration and control aim the highest target payout ratios 
and also display the stickiest cash dividend. This suggests that signalling is an important 
concern for Turkish families and they attempt to show their solid financial performance by 
stable cash dividend payments. Based on the “substitution model of dividends” proposed by 
La porta et al. (2000), this may also imply that Turkish families use cash dividends to 
establish a reputation of good treatment for minority shareholders of the firms under their 
control.  
Furthermore, we find that the ISE firms with non-family blockholders (e.g., foreign 
and domestic financial investors and the state) significantly decrease the target payout ratios 
and abolish dividend smoothing. Similarly, the presence of non-family large shareholders 
reduces the degree of dividend smoothing of the ISE firms that are dominated by families 
and also have other types of blockholders. This evidence may imply that, consistent with the 
notion, argued by Grossman and Hart (1980), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), large shareholders have better incentives and ability to act as an effective 
monitoring mechanism on the managements, which minimises the agency problems and 
consequently reducing, in general, the need for paying cash dividends. In addition, our 
findings show that although the ISE firms with dispersed ownership structures attempt to 
adjust their cash dividends by a serious degree of smoothing, they seem to have 
comparatively very low target payouts. This is contrary to the common belief that minority 
investors prefer higher dividends to increase dividend-induced capital market monitoring and 
reduce what is left for expropriation. 
Finally, we also detect that financial characteristics of firms have significant effects on 
their dividend policy – in particular, more profitable, more mature and larger sized ISE firms 
are more likely to pay cash dividends, whereas the ISE firms with higher investment 
opportunities and more debt are less likely to involve with cash dividend distributions. These 
financial characteristics have the same influence on dividend decisions over the entire 
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period, although this period has witnessed significantly different dividend policy regulations 
imposed by the CMB in the two sub-periods of 2003-2008 and 2009-2012.   
Overall, our results present strong evidence that regulations, reforms and legal 
environment have significant implications on the ISE-listed firms’ dividend policy behaviour in 
the post-2003 period. Particularly, the ISE firms now follow stable dividends policies, 
although relatively less stable policies than developed markets, and the financial 
characteristics of these firms influence their dividend policy in a similar manner of a more 
developed countries. Hence, our study provides useful information for potential investors, 
policy makers and fellow researchers, about these changes in the Turkish market. The study 
also raises the need to assess how the market reacts to the changing dividend policy 
behaviour of the ISE firms. However, this is a promising question left for future research.  
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Table 1. Univariate Results  
 
 
 
 
Sub-period 
2003-2008 
 
(n= 1,160) 
 
Sub-period        
2009-2012 
 
(n= 952) 
Mean 
difference 
Levene’s 
test 
t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
F-statistic 
 
 
t-statistic 
 
 
Z-statistic 
 
 
PANEL A: FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
    
 
Total sales (million TL) 
 
669.62 
 
985.72 
 
−316.10 
 
0.439*** 
 
−2.986*** 
 
−2.663*** 
 
Total assets (million TL) 
 
618.70 
 
1,025.99 
 
−407.29 
 
0.365*** 
 
−4.779*** 
 
−5.460*** 
 
Market capitalisation (million TL)  
 
484.90 
 
865.99 
 
−381.09 
 
0.413*** 
 
−4.313*** 
 
−6.913*** 
 
Net earnings (million TL) 
 
39.47 
 
56.14 
 
−16.67 
 
0.444*** 
 
−2.069** 
 
−0.239 
 
Total debt (million TL) 
 
130.01 
 
278.46 
 
148.45 
 
0.274*** 
 
−5.673*** 
 
−5.316*** 
 
Return on assets (%) 
 
2.85 
 
1.41 
 
1.44 
 
0.488*** 
 
1.768* 
 
2.686*** 
 
Market-to-book ratio 
 
1.381 
 
1.662 
 
−0.281 
 
0.394*** 
 
−4.873*** 
 
−4.838*** 
 
Debt ratio 
 
0.220 
 
0.285 
 
−0.065 
 
0.221*** 
 
−2.719*** 
 
−3.569*** 
 
Firm age (natural logarithm)  
 
3.421 
 
3.475 
 
−0.054 
 
0.934 
 
−2.469** 
 
−3.639*** 
 
Firm size (natural logarithm)  
 
4.625 
 
5.153 
 
−0.528 
 
0.904 
 
−7.130*** 
 
−6.913*** 
Notes: Total sales represent annual gross sales and other operating revenue. Total assets refer to the sum of total current 
assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets. Market capitalisation equals the share price (year-end) multiplied by the common shares 
outstanding. Net earnings represent annual income after all operating and non-operating income and expenses, reserves, 
income taxes, minority interest and extraordinary items. Total debt is the sum of long and short term debt. Return on assets 
is measured by net earnings to total assets. Market-to-book ratio is calculated as a firm's market value divided by its book 
value. Debt ratio is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Firm age is the natural logarithm of firm's age in years. 
Firm size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the firm. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
31 
 
 
 
PANEL B: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
 
 
Family ownership (%)  
 
38.59 
 
40.31 
 
   −1.72 
 
0.914 
 
−1.320 
 
−1.588 
 
Foreign ownership (%) 
 
13.04 
 
12.39 
 
0.65 
 
1.018 
 
0.556 
 
0.913 
 
Domestic institutional holdings(%)  
 
4.28 
 
3.81 
 
0.47 
 
1.013 
 
0.666 
 
1.609 
 
State ownership (%) 
 
1.97 
 
1.06 
 
0.91 
 
2.076*** 
 
2.161** 
 
1.730* 
 
Miscellaneous (%) 
 
2.66 
 
1.98 
 
0.68 
 
1.450*** 
 
1.629 
 
1.125 
 
Ownership dispersion (%) 
 
35.44 
 
36.24 
 
   −0.80 
 
0.837 
 
−0.907 
 
−0.252 
 
Board size 
 
6.59 
 
6.66 
 
   −0.07 
 
0.952 
 
−0.754 
 
−0.563 
 
Family directors 
 
1.50 
 
1.62 
 
   −0.12 
 
0.943 
 
−1.624 
 
−1.639 
Notes: Family ownership represents the total percentage of outstanding shares held by family members, family managers 
and family-controlled holding companies. Foreign ownership is the sum of total shares owned by foreign corporations, 
foreign financial institutions and foreign nationals. Domestic institutional holdings refer to the total percentage of shares held 
by Turkish financial institutions. State ownership includes the central government and its wholly owned enterpr ises’ 
shareholdings. Miscellaneous represents the share-ownership of organisations such as cooperatives, voting trusts and a 
company or a group with no single controlling investor. Ownership dispersion is measured as the total percentage of shares 
owned by a large number of small (minority) shareholders who held less than 5% of the outstanding shares of the firm. ***, 
** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
PANEL C: CASH DIVIDEND CHARACTERISTICS  
 
 
Cash dividend-payers (%)  
 
33.88 
 
33.82 
 
0.06 
 
1.000 
 
0.026 
 
0.027 
 
Cash dividends (million TL) 
 
15.85 
 
25.72 
 
−9.87 
 
0.477*** 
 
−1.980** 
 
−0.339 
 
Dividends per share (TL)  
 
0.169 
 
0.172 
 
−0.003 
 
2.761*** 
 
−0.094 
 
−0.396 
 
Dividend payout ratio† (%) 
 
25.50 
 
22.85 
 
2.65 
 
2.384*** 
 
0.659 
 
0.643 
 
Dividend yield (%) 
 
2.09 
 
1.57 
 
0.68 
 
1.982*** 
 
2.971*** 
 
0.971 
Notes: Cash dividend-payers refer to the percentage number that is measured as cash dividend paying firms divided by 
total firms in the sample. Cash dividends equal to the total annual common and preferred dividends paid in cash to 
shareholders. Dividends per share represent the total dividends per share declared annually. Dividend payout ratio is 
calculated as the dividends per share divided by the earnings per share. Dividend yield is measured as the ratio of dividends 
per share to price per share. †Dividend payout ratio has 1,144 firm-year observations for the 2003-2008 period and 922 firm-
year observations for the 2009-2012 period, due to the exclusion of negative payout ratio observations when firms make 
losses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2. Lintner Model Specification Results  
 
Dependent variable: DPS
i,t
   
 
   
Model 1 
 
PANEL A: Pooled OLS 
 
 
 
PANEL B: System GMM 
 
Independent variables: 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
EPS
i,t
   
 
0.135*** 
(3.22) 
 
0.151*** 
(4.30) 
 
 
0.120*** 
(5.24) 
 
0.133*** 
(3.57) 
 
DPS
i,t-1
 
 
 
 
0.420*** 
(6.74) 
 
0.407*** 
(9.78) 
  
0.478*** 
(18.32) 
 
0.453*** 
(16.53) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
   
 
−0.021* 
(−1.77) 
 
−0.019* 
(−1.69) 
  
−0.034* 
(−1.93) 
 
−0.028* 
(−1.73) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t
 
 
−0.024* 
(−1.90) 
 
−0.032* 
(−1.86) 
  
−0.017*** 
(−2.96) 
 
−0.021*** 
(−3.30) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t -1
 
 
0.059*** 
(6.08) 
 
0.064*** 
(5.52) 
  
0.031*** 
(7.03) 
 
0.042*** 
(6.48) 
 
Constant  
 
0.043 
(0.89) 
 
0.052 
(1.03) 
  
0.057 
(1.36) 
 
0.063 
(1.58) 
 
INDUSTRY  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
 
PERIOD = 0 (Between 2003 and 2008) 
 
 
  
 
Target payout ratio (r1)  
 
0.233 
 
0.255 
 
 
0.230 
 
0.243 
 
Speed of adjustment (c1) 0.580 0.593  0.522 0.547 
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PERIOD = 1 (Between 2009 and 2012) 
 
    
Target payout ratio (r2) 
 
0.213 0.225  0.210 0.222 
Speed of adjustment (c2) 0.521 
 
0.529  0.491 0.505 
 
Number of observations  
 
1,846 
 
1,121  
 
1,846 
 
1,121 
 
F-statistic 86.93*** 56.36***  55.14*** 39.62*** 
 
R-squared  46.13% 45.91% 
 
   
Arellano-Bond test for (AR1)    Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00 
 
Arellano-Bond test for (AR2)    Pr > z = 0.92 Pr > z = 0.97 
 
Hansen overidentifying test    Pr > chi
2
 = 0.53  Pr > chi
2
 = 0.65 
 
Number of instruments     60 60 
 
Notes: This table reports coefficients and t-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS models are 
tested using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. The two-step, robust 
(Windmeijer’s standard error correction), small (corrections that results in t instead of z statistic for the 
coefficients and F instead of Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in 
panels with gaps) commands are used to make the system GMM estimates even more robust. ***, ** 
and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 3. Summary of Empirical Studies on Lintner's (1956) Parameters  
 
Study  
 
 
Market  
 
 
Period  
 
 
SOA 
 
 
TPR 
 
 
Lintner (1956)  
 
USA 
 
1918-1953 
 
0.30 
 
50% 
 
Fama & Babiak (1968)  
 
 
USA 
 
 
1946-1964 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
33% 
 
Mookerjee (1992) 
 
India 
 
1950-1981 
 
0.73 
 
85% 
 
Dewenter & Warther (1998)  USA 1983-1992 0.06 − 
 Japan 
 
1983-1992 
 
0.09 
 
− 
 
Adaoglu (2000) 
 
Turkey 
 
1985-1997 
 
1.00 
 
52% 
 
Pandey (2001)
† 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
1993-2000 
 
0.20 to 0.63 
 
12% to 76% 
 
Aivazian et al. (2003a)
††
  
 
 
Turkey  
   All firms  
   Dividend-payers 
  
1983-1990 
 
 
 
 
        0.92 
        0.88 
 
 
       49% 
       52% 
 
Brav et al. (2005)  USA 1950-1964 0.66 35% 
  1965-1983 0.35 24% 
  1984-2002 
 
0.22 
 
11% 
 
Al-Najjar (2009) 
 
Jordan 
 
1994-2003 
 
0.43 
 
48% 
 
Chemmanur et al. (2010) USA 1984-2002 0.28 − 
 Hong Kong 
 
1984-2002 
 
0.68 
 
− 
 
Al-Ajmi & Abo Hussain (2011) 
  
Saudi Arabia 
 
1990-2006 
 
0.71 
 
43% 
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Al-Malkawi et al. (2014)  
 
Oman 
 
2001-2010 
 
0.26 
 
79% 
 
Present Study  
 
 
Turkey 
     All firms 
     Divided-payers  
2003-2008 
 
 
 
0.58 
0.59 
 
23.3% 
25.5% 
 
 
Turkey 
     All firms 
     Divided-payers  
2009-2012 
 
 
 
0.52 
0.53 
 
21.3% 
22.5% 
Notes: SOA= Speed of adjustment, TPR = Target payout ratio. 
†
The study uses the Lintner model to test the 
dividend stability of Malaysian firms in six different industrial sectors and reports the SOA and TPR values 
that vary considerably across the industrial sectors. 
††
The study investigates dividend polices of firms from 
eight different emerging markets and a control sample of US firms; however, we only report the results 
provided from the Turkish market.  
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Table 4. Results of Pooled OLS and System GMM Estimates for Variant Specifications of Lintner Model  
 
Dependent variable: DPS
i,t
   
 
         
Model 2 & 3  
 
PANEL A: Pooled OLS 
 
  
PANEL B: System GMM 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
Model 3 
 
  
Model 2 
 
  
Model 3  
 
 
Independent variables: 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
EPS
i,t
   
 
0.088*** 
(2.80) 
 
0.079*** 
(2.62) 
 
 
0.105** 
(2.16) 
 
0.132** 
(2.55) 
  
0.072*** 
(2.99) 
 
0.065*** 
(2.74) 
  
0.098*** 
(4.55) 
 
0.121*** 
(5.34) 
 
EPS
i,t-1 
 
 
0.105*** 
(3.99) 
 
0.120*** 
(4.67) 
   
  
0.107*** 
(4.33) 
 
0.139*** 
(5.44) 
 
  
 
DPS
i,t-1
 
 
 
 
0.371*** 
(4.82) 
 
0.330*** 
(4.47) 
  
0.512*** 
(3.82) 
 
0.477*** 
(3.66) 
  
0.365*** 
(7.15) 
 
0.343*** 
(6.49) 
  
0.537*** 
(6.55) 
 
0.492*** 
(6.24) 
 
DEBT
i,t
 
    
−0.156* 
(−1.74) 
 
−0.243* 
(−1.86) 
     
−0.196** 
(−2.19) 
 
−0.280** 
(−2.31) 
 
DEBT
i,t-1
 
    
−0.443** 
(−2.12) 
 
−0.551** 
(−2.23) 
     
−0.523*** 
(−3.03) 
 
−0.612*** 
(−3.19) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
   
 
−0.046* 
(−1.73) 
 
−0.057* 
(−1.79) 
  
−0.078* 
(−1.90) 
 
−0.052* 
(−1.69) 
  
−0.035** 
(−2.20) 
 
−0.060** 
(−2.39) 
  
−0.061** 
(−2.17) 
 
−0.055** 
(−2.06) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t
 
 
−0.017** 
(−2.40) 
 
−0.013** 
(−2.38) 
  
−0.020*** 
(−2.89) 
 
−0.037*** 
(−3.77) 
  
−0.011** 
(−2.45) 
 
−0.009** 
(−2.30) 
  
−0.018*** 
(−2.70) 
 
−0.031*** 
(−3.28) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t-1
 
 
−0.043*** 
(−2.62) 
 
−0.059*** 
(−3.31) 
     
−0.038*** 
(−3.02) 
 
−0.041*** 
(−3.16) 
   
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t -1
 
 
0.087*** 
(3.86) 
 
0.096*** 
(3.93) 
  
0.055*** 
(6.43) 
 
0.062*** 
(8.31) 
  
0.069*** 
(5.30) 
 
0.082*** 
(5.71) 
  
0.042*** 
(6.82) 
 
0.054*** 
(8.73) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t 
 
   
 
−0.046* 
(−1.77) 
 
−0.051* 
(−1.91) 
 
  
  
−0.049** 
(−2.31) 
 
−0.058** 
(−2.49) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t -1
 
   
 
−0.244** 
(−2.20) 
 
−0.380** 
(−2.48) 
 
  
  
−0.365*** 
(−2.63) 
 
−0.495*** 
(−2.85) 
 
Constant  
 
0.028 
(1.14) 
 
0.042 
(1.36) 
  
0.037 
(1.30) 
 
0.051 
(1.41) 
  
0.030 
(1.34) 
 
0.049 
(1.59) 
  
0.044 
(1.27) 
 
0.057 
(1.40) 
 
INDUSTRY  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
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PERIOD = 0 (Between 2003 and 2008) 
 
Target payout ratio (r1)
†
 
 
− 
 
− 
 
 
0.215 
 
0.252 
  
− 
 
− 
  
0.209 
 
0.238 
 
Speed of adjustment (c1) 
 
0.629 
 
0.670 
 
 
0.488 
 
0.523 
 
 
0.635 
 
0.657 
 
 
0.463 
 
0.508 
 
 
PERIOD = 1 (Between 2009 and 2012) 
 
Target payout ratio (r2)
†
  
 
− 
 
− 
 
 
0.196 
 
0.206 
  
− 
 
− 
  
0.190 
 
0.198 
 
Speed of adjustment (c2) 
 
0.542 
 
0.574 
 
 
0.433 
 
0.461 
 
 
0.566 
 
0.575 
 
 
0.421 
 
0.454 
 
 
Number of observations  
 
1,846 
 
1,121  
 
1.846 
 
1,121 
  
1,846 
 
1,121 
  
1,846 
 
1,121 
 
F-statistic 78.89*** 50.69***  66.62*** 46.36***  54.94*** 37.56***  46.60*** 23.38*** 
 
R-squared  46.37% 45.96% 
 
 46.66% 46.16%       
Arellano-Bond test for (AR1)         Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00  Pr > z = 0.00   Pr > z = 0.00 
 
Arellano-Bond test for (AR2)       Pr > z = 0.58 Pr > z = 0.61     Pr > z = 0.87   Pz > z = 0.93 
 
Hansen overidentifying test       Pr > chi
2
 = 0.73 Pz > chi
2
 = 0.82  Pr > chi
2
 = 0.96 Pr > chi
2
 = 0.99 
 
 
Number of instruments   
     61 61  121 121 
Notes: This table reports coefficients and t-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust 
regressions. The two-step, robust (Windmeijer’s standard error correction), small (corrections that results in t instead of z statistic for the coefficients and F instead of 
Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with gaps) commands are used to make the system GMM estimates even more robust. 
† 
Since the lagged earnings per share variable is added into the equation, the target payout ratios cannot be calculated for Model 2, as proposed by Lintner (1956).
  
***, ** 
and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Model 2: DPS
i,t
 = α
i   
+ β
1
EPS
i,t
  + β
2
EPS
i,t-1
 + β
3
DPS
i,t-1
 + β
4
PERIOD
i,t
 + β
5
(PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t
) + β
6
(PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t-1
) + β
7
(PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t -1
) + 
 ∑  𝑛𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYj,i,t  +  ui,t ,   
 
Model 3:  DPS
i,t
  =  α
i   
+  β
1
EPS
i,t
  + β
2
DPS
i,t-1
 + β
3
DEBT
i,t
  + β
4
DEBT
i,t-1
 + β
5
PERIOD
i,t
 + β
6
(PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t
) + β
7
(PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t -1
) + β
8
(PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t
) +     
                 β
9
(PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t -1
) +  ∑  𝑛𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYj,i,t  + ui,t ,  
 
where DPS
i,t 
is the current dividends per share, EPS
i,t
 is the current earnings per share, and DEBT
i,t
 is the current debt ratio (measured as total debt divided by total 
assets) for firm i at year t; EPS
i,t-1 
is the lagged earnings per share, DPS
i,t-1 
is the lagged dividends per share, and  DEBT
i,t-1 
is the lagged debt ratio for firm i that distributed 
in year t-1 (previous year); PERIOD
i,t 
is a dummy taking a value of 0 for the sub-period 2003-2008 and 1 for the sub-period 2009-2012; (PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t 
), (PERIOD
i,t
 x 
EPS
i,t -1
), (PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t-1 
), (PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t 
) and (PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t-1 
) are the interaction terms between period dummy and current earnings per share, lagged 
earnings per share, lagged dividends per share, current debt ratio and lagged debt ratio, respectively; INDUSTRY
j,i,t 
 is a vector of dummy variables representing 14 
different industries (based on ICB codes). 
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Table 5. Results of Pooled OLS Estimates for Ownership Structure Effect on Lintner Model Specification 
 
Dependent variable: DPS
i,t
   
 
         
Model 1 
 
Subsample A 
 
 
 
Subsample B 
 
 
 
Subsample C 
 
 
 
Subsample D 
 
 
Independent variables: 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
  
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
  
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
EPS
i,t
   
 
0.074** 
(2.08) 
 
0.081** 
(2.13) 
 
 
0.156*** 
(6.83) 
 
0.169*** 
(7.11) 
 
 
0.116*** 
(4.96) 
 
0.130*** 
(5.89) 
 
 
0.036** 
(2.26) 
 
0.040** 
(2.33) 
 
DPS
i,t-1
 
 
 
 
0.751*** 
(5.10) 
 
0.749*** 
(4.89) 
  
0.047*** 
(3.86) 
 
0.051*** 
(3.89) 
  
0.536*** 
(4.47) 
 
0.530*** 
(3.95) 
  
0.638*** 
(3.07) 
 
0.640*** 
(3.15) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
   
 
−0.022* 
(−1.17) 
 
−0.046* 
(−1.86) 
  
−0.106*** 
(−4.36) 
 
−0.107*** 
(−4.42) 
  
−0.019* 
(−1.88) 
 
−0.035* 
(−1.91) 
  
−0.055** 
(−2.12) 
 
−0.069** 
(−2.38) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t
 
 
−0.014** 
(−2.40) 
 
−0.015** 
(−2.55) 
  
−0.029*** 
(−6.71) 
 
−0.034*** 
(−7.30) 
  
−0.024** 
(−2.04) 
 
−0.035** 
(−2.16) 
  
−0.008** 
(−2.21) 
 
−0.009** 
(−2.39) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t -1
 
 
0.031*** 
(10.48) 
 
0.028*** 
(9.14) 
  
0.017*** 
(6.97) 
 
0.023*** 
(8.59) 
  
0.062*** 
(5.79) 
 
0.066*** 
(6.49) 
  
0.052*** 
(3.47) 
 
0.058*** 
(3.54) 
 
Constant  
 
0.035 
(0.61) 
 
0.052 
(1.17) 
  
0.062 
(1.10) 
 
0.055 
(1.02) 
  
0.027* 
(1.69) 
 
0.041* 
(1.81) 
  
0.058 
(1.40) 
 
0.071 
(1.54) 
 
INDUSTRY  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
PERIOD = 0 (Between 2003 and 2008)           
 
Target payout ratio (r1)  
 
0.297 
 
0.323  
 
0.164 
 
0.178  
 
0.250 
 
0.277  
 
0.099 
 
0.111 
 
Speed of adjustment (c1) 
 
0.249 
 
0.251  
 
0.953 
 
0.949  
 
0.464 
 
0.470  
 
0.362 
 
0.360 
 
PERIOD = 1 (Between 2009 and 2012)           
 
Target payout ratio (r2)  
 
0.274 
 
0.296  
 
0.136 
 
0.145  
 
0.229 
 
0.235  
 
0.090 
 
0.103 
 
Speed of adjustment (c2) 
 
0.218 
 
0.223  
 
0.936 
 
0.926  
 
0.402 
 
0.404  
 
0.311 
 
0.302 
 
 
Number of observations  
 
1,056 
 
497  
 
412 
 
322  
 
195 
 
162  
 
183 
 
140 
 
F-statistic 52.45*** 35.83***  21.63*** 20.92***  65.69*** 55.56***  41.48*** 36.79*** 
 
R-squared  46.21% 44.42% 
 
 63.37% 62.80%  56.54% 55.03%  47.95% 45.55% 
Notes: This table reports coefficients and t-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions . ***, ** 
and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Subsample A: Firms with family ownership concentration and control. 
Subsample B: Firms with only non-family blockholders (such as foreign and domestic financial institutions and the state).   
Subsample C: Firms with both family and non-family blockholders. 
Subsample D: Firm with no blockholders (dispersed ownership structures with single ownership below 5%).  
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Table 6. Results of System GMM Estimates for Ownership Structure Effect on Lintner Model Specification 
 
Dependent variable: DPS
i,t
   
 
         
Model 1 
 
Subsample A 
 
 
 
Subsample B 
 
 
 
Subsample C 
 
 
 
Subsample D 
 
 
Independent variables: 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
 
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
  
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
  
All firms 
 
 
Dividend 
payers 
 
 
EPS
i,t
   
 
0.078*** 
(2.96) 
 
0.092*** 
(3.03) 
 
 
0.160*** 
(15.80) 
 
0.172*** 
(16.43) 
 
 
0.117*** 
(5.38) 
 
0.136*** 
(6.87) 
 
 
0.039** 
(2.34) 
 
0.043** 
(2.48) 
 
DPS
i,t-1
 
 
 
 
0.734*** 
(6.21) 
 
0.727*** 
(5.77) 
 
 
0.038*** 
(10.09) 
 
0.043*** 
(11.47) 
 
 
0.514*** 
(6.51) 
 
0.506*** 
(6.40) 
 
 
0.620*** 
(5.94) 
 
0.625*** 
(6.26) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
   
 
−0.041** 
(−2.30) 
 
−0.066** 
(−2.42) 
 
 
−0.091*** 
(−2.98) 
 
−0.099*** 
(−3.12) 
 
 
−0.029** 
(−1.74) 
 
−0.034** 
(−1.89) 
 
 
−0.060** 
(−2.46) 
 
−0.073** 
(−2.53) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x EPS
i,t
 
 
−0.020*** 
(−6.13) 
 
−0.018*** 
(−5.98) 
 
 
−0.038*** 
(−5.34) 
 
−0.042*** 
(−5.59) 
 
 
−0.026*** 
(−4.73) 
 
−0.030*** 
(−4.91) 
 
 
−0.011*** 
(−2.65) 
 
−0.013*** 
(−2.92) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DPS
i,t -1
 
 
0.046*** 
(8.63) 
 
0.032*** 
(7.11) 
 
 
0.021*** 
(3.57) 
 
0.028*** 
(3.66) 
 
 
0.067*** 
(10.04) 
 
0.078*** 
(10.83) 
 
 
0.059*** 
(3.71) 
 
0.061*** 
(3.95) 
 
Constant  
 
0.053 
(0.40) 
 
0.074 
(0.52) 
 
 
0.076 
(1.54) 
 
0.070 
(1.48) 
 
 
0.038** 
(2.14) 
 
0.052** 
(2.31) 
 
 
0.062 
(0.75) 
 
0.084 
(0.96) 
 
INDUSTRY  
 
Yes  
 
Yes   
 
Yes  
 
Yes   
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
 
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
PERIOD = 0 (Between 2003 and 2008)           
 
Target payout ratio (r1)  
 
0.293 
 
0.337  
 
0.166 
 
0.180  
 
0.241 
 
0.275  
 
0.103 
 
0.115 
 
Speed of adjustment (c1) 
 
0.266 
 
0.273  
 
0.962 
 
0.957  
 
0.486 
 
0.494  
 
0.380 
 
0.375 
 
PERIOD = 1 (Between 2009 and 2012)           
 
Target payout ratio (r2)  
 
0.264 
 
0.307  
 
0.130 
 
0.140  
 
0.217 
 
0.255  
 
0.087 
 
0.096 
 
Speed of adjustment (c2) 
 
0.220 
 
0.241  
 
0.941 
 
0.929  
 
0.419 
 
0.416  
 
0.321 
 
0.314 
 
 
Number of observations  
 
1,056 
 
497  
 
412 
 
322  
 
195 
 
162  
 
183 
 
140 
 
F-statistic 36.52*** 24.76***  20.37*** 18.63***  41.05*** 47.22***  81.11*** 77.02*** 
 
 
Arellano-Bond test for (AR1)    Pr > z = 0.00     Pr > z = 0.00      Pr > z = 0.00     Pr > z = 0.00     Pr > z = 0.00    Pr > z = 0.00      Pr > z = 0.00      Pr > z = 0.00 
  
Arellano-Bond test for (AR2)  Pr > z = 0.49  Pr > z = 0.51   Pr > z = 0.28  Pr > z = 0.27  Pr > z = 0.46 Pr > z = 0.45   Pr > z = 0.70  Pr > z = 0.72 
 
Hansen overidentifying test  Pr > chi2 = 0.41  Pr > chi2 = 0.46  Pr > chi2 = 0.90  Pr > chi2 = 0.84  Pr > chi2 = 0.77  Pr > chi2 = 0.74  Pr > chi2 = 0.89  Pr > chi2 = 0.91 
 
Number of instruments  60 60  60 60  60 60  60 60 
Notes: This table reports coefficients and t-statistics in the parenthesis. The two-step, robust (Windmeijer’s standard error correction), small (corrections that results in t instead of 
z statistic for the coefficients and F instead of Wald X2 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with gaps) commands are used to make the system 
GMM estimates even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Subsample A: Firms with family ownership concentration and control. 
Subsample B: Firms with only non-family blockholders (such as foreign and domestic financial institutions and the state). 
Subsample C: Firms with both family and non-family blockholders. 
Subsample D: Firm with no blockholders (dispersed ownership structures with single ownership below 5%). 
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Table 7. Results of Logit Model Estimates for Dividend Payment Decisions  
 
Dependent variable: DPAY
i,t
 (0/1) 
 
   
Logit Model 
 
PANEL A: Pooled Logit 
 
 
 
PANEL B: Random Effects Logit 
 
Independent variables: 
 
Coefficient 
estimates 
 
 Marginal 
effects  
 
 
 
Coefficient 
estimates 
 
 
Marginal 
effects  
 
 
ROA
i,t-1
   
 
10.755*** 
(8.48) 
 
1.896*** 
(8.35) 
 
 
11.035*** 
(5.99) 
 
1.137*** 
(6.29) 
 
INVEST
i,t-1
 
 
 
 
−0.779** 
(−2.45) 
 
−0.135** 
(−2.57) 
  
−1.490*** 
(−3.02) 
 
−0.150*** 
(−3.16) 
 
DEBT
i,t-1
 
 
 
 
−2.174*** 
(−4.87) 
 
−0.377*** 
(−5.01) 
  
−2.701*** 
(−2.63) 
 
−0.278*** 
(−2.84) 
 
AGE
i,t-1
   
 
0.294* 
(1.69) 
 
0.051* 
(1.71) 
 
 
0.637** 
(2.24) 
 
0.065** 
(2.55) 
 
SIZE
i,t-1
   
 
0.665*** 
(9.67) 
 
0.115*** 
(7.55) 
 
 
0.992*** 
(7.31) 
 
0.102*** 
(8.51) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
   
 
−1.169 
(−1.18) 
 
−0.203 
(−1.17) 
  
−1.392 
(−1.00) 
 
−0.143 
(−1.03) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x ROA
i,t-1
 
 
1.170 
(0.56) 
 
0.205 
(0.56) 
  
0.350 
(0.16) 
 
0.036 
(0.16) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x INVEST
i,t -1
 
 
−0.988 
(−1.00) 
 
−0.173 
(−1.01) 
  
−0.392 
(−0.29) 
 
−0.040 
(−0.29) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x DEBT
i,t-1
 
 
−0.578 
(−0.90) 
 
−0.100 
(−0.91) 
  
−1.621 
(−1.43) 
 
−0.167 
(−1.43) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x AGE
i,t-1
 
 
0.401 
(1.52) 
 
0.070 
(1.52) 
  
0.655 
(1.63) 
 
0.067 
(1.63) 
 
PERIOD
i,t
 x SIZE
i,t-1
 
 
0.340 
(0.40) 
 
0.059 
(0.39) 
  
0.122 
(0.97) 
 
0.025 
(0.97) 
 
Constant  
 
−4.077*** 
(−5.97) 
 
 
  
−5.129*** 
(−6.60) 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
  
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
 
Number of observations  
 
1,846 
 
1,846  
 
1,846 
 
1,846 
 
Wald X
2
  403.69***   183.31*** 
 
 
Pseudo R
2
  35.48%     
Rho value     0.6123 
 
 
 
Likelihood ratio test     277.75***  
 
Notes: This table reports the logit estimates and z-statistics in the parenthesis. Independent variables 
are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust 
regressions. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
